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ABSTRACT
Although the conﬁguration of modern networks has a signif-
icant impact on the performance, robustness, and security of
applications, networks lack support for reporting these dif-
ferences. This paper presents the design and implementation
of NetQuery, a novel, general-purpose channel for dissemi-
nating the properties of networks and their participants. Net-
Query implements a distributed, decentralized, tuple-based
attribute store that records information about network enti-
ties. Operators can add new tuples into this store and can
also annotate existing tuples with new, custom attributes,
thus allowing the system to support network entities and
properties not anticipated at the time of deployment. Net-
Query clients can query this attribute store for the current
network state and install event triggers to detect future state
transitions, thus establishing long-running guarantees over
the behavior of the network. We have implemented Net-
Query and deployed networks with NetQuery-enabled de-
vices that leverage commodity trusted hardware to provide
strong assurance over the accuracy of reported properties.
We describe the NetQuery system, outline the types of new
applications enabled by NetQuery, and report on the perfor-
mance of the system from deployments of real devices and
from simulations of ISP networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Depending on their conﬁguration, administration and pro-
visioning, networkscanprovidedrasticallydifferentfeatures.
For instance, some networks provide little failure resilience
while others provision failover capacity and deploy middle-
boxes to protect against denial of service attacks [4]; some
networks provide network neutral access while others selec-
tively throttle applications [12]; and some networks provide
conﬁdentiality guarantees while others monitor a user’s re-
quest stream to build an advertising proﬁle [17]. Yet the
standard IP interface masks these differences, as every net-
work appears to provide the same basic “dial-tone” service.
Consequently, clients resort to ad hoc techniques to detect
these differences or target the lowest common denominator
service.
Similarly, conﬁguration differences between end hosts are
of interest to network operators, yet network operators lack a
channel for securely querying the properties of their clients.
For instance, hosts conﬁgured without ﬁrewalls and virus
checkers can launch internal attacks on a protected network,
while hosts with untrusted network stacks can monitor net-
work trafﬁc or consume excess network capacity. Network
administratorsoftenresorttoexpensivemanualscanstocheck
their clients’ conﬁgurations [15]. Similarly, lack of a stan-
dard channel to the user leads ISPs to try to communicate
with the user through disruptive mechanisms such as captive
portals and interstitial web pages. These mechanisms are
brittle, complex and can break client applications.
This paper describes NetQuery, a general-purpose chan-
nel for distributing and reasoning about the properties of net-
work entities. By network entities, we mean both the phys-
ical devices, such as routers, switches, and end hosts, and
the virtual entities, such as ﬂows and applications, that com-
prise a network. Each network entity is associated with a
set of properties, represented in NetQuery as unconstrained
attribute/value pairs. These properties may be intrinsic to
a device, such as a router’s routing tables, or they may be
arbitrary labels assigned by third parties, such as a certiﬁ-
cate from an audit service that a router is properly conﬁg-
ured. NetQuery implements a distributed, decentralized tu-
plestore that stores the attribute/value pairs of network enti-
ties. Thetuplestoreprovidesaqueryinterfacethroughwhich
applications can retrieve the properties of network entities
and a trigger interface through which applications can de-
tect changes to these properties. These interfaces support
the establishment of long-running guarantees about the net-
work: the query interface enables applications to deduce
that a guarantee holds for an initial network state, while the
trigger interface enables applications to detect and modify,
where applicable, network changes that can invalidate the
guarantee.
While NetQuery provides a globally uniﬁed interface, the
implementation and deployment of the tuplestore is decen-
tralized. Every network operator deploys a NetQuery server
dedicated to storing the attribute/value pairs for its portion
of the network and speciﬁes an access policy to these at-
tribute/value pairs. NetQuery enables anyone to tag any en-
tity with an arbitrary property without the need for a central
administrator to mediate conﬂicts.
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tion from different sources, NetQuery enables applications
to identify information from sources that they trust. The tu-
plespace records for each attribute the principal, such as a
device, system administrator, or audit service, that generated
it. A policy language enables applications to establish trust
in the attribute/value pairs stored in NetQuery, and to control
access to proprietary information and sensitive operations.
Reasoningaboutpropertiesofremotenetworkentitiesonly
makes sense when there is an established basis to trust their
claims. NetQuery is based on a “clean-slate” design where
all networked components are assumed to be equipped with
secure hardware coprocessors; this trusted hardware serves
as a root of trust for claims about the network. Coprocessors
such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are cheap and
becoming ubiquitous [6]. Such secure hardware makes it
possible to issue unforgeable certiﬁcates describing the soft-
ware environment and dynamic state of a device through a
mechanism known as attestation [8]. While our work fo-
cuses on translating such local guarantees into network-level
assurance, we also discuss how current systems equipped
with management interfaces such as SNMP but no secure
coprocessor might evolve towards supporting NetQuery ser-
vices. The base system design supports incremental deploy-
ment, though such a deployment necessitates a larger trusted
computing base (TCB).
Three sample scenarios illustrate the types of applications
that NetQuery enables:
• Checking end hosts. Misconﬁgured end hosts can
compromise the integrity of a network. A NetQuery-
enabled network can restrict access based on the con-
ﬁguration of end hosts. For instance, before allowing
a newly connected end host to send packets, a switch
can verify that the end host is running the latest soft-
ware versions and a virus checker.
• Checking paths. Middleboxes that can perform so-
phisticated deep packet inspection for large volumes
of network trafﬁc enable ISPs to monitor and modify
streams that traverse their network. A privacy con-
scious user who wants to know how data from her web
sessions will be monitored can use NetQuery to dis-
cover whether there are entities that can potentially ac-
cess and record her sessions and, if applicable, to ob-
tain guarantees from the network on how packets are
handled.
• Diﬀerentiating providers. Customers currently dif-
ferentiatebetweenISPsbasedsolelyonreputation. Net-
Query enables ISPs to advertise the performance and
robustness features that they provide. For instance, a
wireless service provider can use NetQuery to adver-
tise its backhaul capacity and trafﬁc management tech-
niques; clients can use this to select the best available
network.
Figure 1: A simple network and its tuplespace
representation. Every network entity has a corre-
sponding set of tuples that describes its current conﬁg-
uration and state. Attribute/value pairs are prepended
with the speaker name.
Thispaper outlinesthecase forNetQueryand makesthree
contributions. First, it proposes a set of abstractions for
disseminating network properties and outlines a realizable
distributed architecture for storing meta-information about
network entities. Second, it proposes a representation for
network entities and their properties and shows, by way of
example applications, how analysis over this representation
enables novel applications. Finally, it shows that NetQuery
scales to the query load from millions of clients and to the
volume of properties needed to represent the devices of a
large network.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
NetQuery abstractions and interfaces. Section 3 describes
how applications establish the verity of properties, and how
information providers control access to properties. Section
4 provides example applications. Section 5 describes our
implementation, and Section 6 reports the performance of
the system. Section 7 presents related work, and Section 8
concludes.
2. THE NETQUERY TUPLESPACE
The central abstraction for disseminating network infor-
mation in NetQuery is that of a tuplespace (Figure 1). The
tuplespace presents to applications a tuple-based representa-
tion of the network that reﬂects its topology and conﬁgura-
tion and describes every network entity with a corresponding
set of tuples that describes its external connections, internal
conﬁguration, and runtime state. In addition to the basic ac-
cess interfaces for storing and retrieving data, the tuplespace
provides attribution and extensibility for tuples and can del-
egate its operation to different administrative domains, that
together make it well-suited for representing heterogeneous
networks such as the Internet.
Every NetQuery entity accesses the tuplespace as a prin-
cipal. A principal is a user that is granted access privileges to
the tuplespace. Every principal is associated with a unique
public/private key pair. This key acts as an identiﬁer for the
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though NetQuery presents a uniﬁed tuplespace, the im-
plementation is decentralized across multiple adminis-
trative domains and distributed across multiple servers,
including those embedded in network components.
principal, without the need to resort to PKI certiﬁcates to
provide identities and is used for authentication.
NetQuery provides a single global tuplespace for the In-
ternet that is distributed across multiple tuplespace servers.
The responsibility for managing subspaces, disjoint subsets
of the tuplespace, is delegated to multiple administrative do-
mains (Figure 2). Every AS or third party information ser-
vice manages a subspace covering its own network and an-
notations. An AS or information service is responsible for
deploying tuplespace servers for storing their local tuples
and is empowered to deﬁne an access policy for the tuples
within their subspace.
2.1 Data model and representation
Every tuple is named by an opaque, globally unique tuple
ID (TID) and stores data as typed attribute/value pairs.
NetQuery provides scalar primitives, references, and aggre-
gate attribute types. Integers and strings comprise the scalar
primitives. References contain pointers to NetQuery tuples,
encoded as tuple IDs, and are used to chain NetQuery tuples
into complex data structures such as trees or graphs. Aggre-
gate types, such as vectors, sets, and tries, are used to repre-
sent information of varying cardinality, such as the forward-
ing entries used during routing. Applications and devices
create, read, modify, and delete tuples and attribute/value
pairs using primitive operations exported by the tuplespace.
Tuples conform to schemas, which deﬁne the set of at-
tribute/value pairs that all tuples for a given kind of network
entity must provide. The schema thus establishes a common
baseline representation that enables programmers to write
analysis code over the various network entities. A schema
differs from a class in object systems in that it describes just
this common set of attribute/value pairs and not the code or
operations. The schema name of an tuple is stored within
Figure 3: NetQuery extensibility and annota-
tions. A BGP NetQuery router has extended the base
router representation with information about its BGP
conﬁguration. A third-party audit service has anno-
tated router X after checking its conﬁguration.
the tuple type attribute of the tuple. NetQuery clients use this
ﬁeld to determine how to interpret the attribute/value pairs
contained in a tuple.
NetQuery provides built-in schemas for representing pro-
cessing entities, whichdescribethedevicesorsoftwareend-
points that generate, receive, or forward packets; and for rep-
resenting protocol entities, which describe the higher-level
conversations between processing entities. Every packet is
associated with one or more protocol entities. Processing en-
tities include hosts, routers, switches, network cards, and ap-
plications. ProtocolentitiesincludeTCPconnections, TCP/UDP
endpoints, and IPsec security associations.
These schemas together enable a comprehensive descrip-
tion of all network entities that covers their hardware and
software conﬁguration. The tuples for processing entities
describe their operation in terms of their functional blocks,
such as switching fabrics, network interfaces, network links,
and packet ﬁlters. Tuples with this generic representation
are not restricted to describing only existing network enti-
ties and can be used to extend NetQuery with support for
new kinds of network components. The schemas for proto-
col constructs describe the protocol state and end points.
Any NetQuery speaker, whether the creator of a tuple or a
third party, can extend a tuple with additional attribute/value
pairs, called annotations (Figure 3). For instance, a router
that implements BGP can annotate the base router tuple with
BGP conﬁguration information. A third-party audit service
can run a conﬁguration analysis tool such rcc [7] to annotate
a router with the property
consistent conﬁg = true
asserting that it has been conﬁgured to propagate consistent
routes.
2.2 Initialization and state maintenance
Every network device present in the network corresponds
to a tuple. The tuples and their attribute/value pairs can be
initialized and maintained by different parties, including the
device itself, its administrator, or a third party.
In clean-slate deployments, every NetQuery device ini-
tializes its own tuplespace representation and is conﬁgured
with a local NetQuery server. On start up, a device issues
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that represent it, and issues update() operations to set the
attribute/value pairs based on its local conﬁguration and ini-
tial state. For instance, a freshly activated router creates tu-
ples for all of its interfaces and exports its initial forward-
ing table state. A newly connected endpoint creates tuples
for each of its interfaces and deﬁnes attribute/value pairs de-
scribingitssystemstatisticssuchasOSversion, networkser-
vices provided, or any security guarantees obtainable from
trusted hardware. Incremental deployments, wherein not all
devicesembedNetQueryspeakers, usemanagementservices,
such as SNMP-to-NetQuery proxies, to export the same per-
device information.
2.3 Queries
NetQuery applications use the contents of the tuplespace
to derive conclusions about network devices, processes, and
the network itself. In principle, NetQuery applications use
the entire tuplespace state as the basis for these conclusions.
In practice, applications perform tuplespace queries to ﬁnd
and retrieve the relevant subset of this state and install trig-
gers to detect any network changes that might impact the
conclusion. The process of inferring some high-level char-
acteristics aboutthenetwork, suchastheroutebetweentwo
hosts, from low-level properties, such as routing tables, is
called analysis. Together, the combination of queries and
triggers can check a range of properties that varies in breadth
of network coverage and duration of validity.
Clients discover tuples of interest by issuing query() to
the tuplespace. query() accepts a tuple pattern as a param-
eter and returns the TIDs of tuples that match this pattern.
Tuple patterns consist of boolean combinations of predicates
over the contents of a tuple. These predicates specify iden-
tity and wildcard matches for attribute values, tuple IDs, and
principal names. For instance, the query
tuple type = Router AND zip code = 10001 AND tid
= AT&T :: ∗
returns the tuple IDs of all routers at a particular geographic
region, restrictedtothosetuplesdescribingAT&T’snetwork.
NetQuery executes queries on tuplespace servers, enabling
clientstoefﬁcientlysearchfortupleswithoutretrievinglarge
portions of the tuplespace. The pattern language speciﬁcally
excludes operations such as allocation, loop constructs, and
recursion, that can consume unbounded amounts of mem-
ory and computation. Hence, queries are safe to execute on
tuplespace servers.
Clients issue retrieve() to access tuples whose tuple IDs
they already know. This operation takes a tuple ID and a
set of attribute names, speciﬁed as an attribute name pattern,
and returns the corresponding attribute values from the spec-
iﬁed tuple if they exist. The operation returns an error if the
attribute/value pair does not exist. A client might acquire
tuple IDs for use in retrieve() from the reference-typed at-
tribute/value pairs of another tuple, or receive them out of
band.
Applications vary in how they derive properties and in the
consistency guarantees that they need. Some properties de-
rive from the value of a single attribute. For instance, a phys-
ical link is either wired or wireless and a single query suf-
ﬁces to return the relevant attribute. Other properties derive
from multiple attribute/value pairs. For instance, NetQuery
can determine the route to a destination by iterating through
routing tables: each iteration retrieves the next hop router for
the next iteration.
When multiple attribute values are requested by an ap-
plication, NetQuery returns a recent value for each. This
consistency between multiple attribute values is analogous
to that provided by sampling the network state with probes,
such as by sending packets to perform traceroute or band-
width measurement. Applications typically send multiple
packets for a characteristic: for instance, in traceroute, a
packet is sent for every hop on a path. Similarly, NetQuery
analyses based on multiple attribute/value pairs generally re-
trieve these with a sequence of queries. Probes reveal infor-
mation about the network as packets traverses it and thus
only measure a particular slice of the network at a particular
point of time. Should the network change during probing or
attribute retrieval, both the probe- and attribute-based analy-
ses will potentially use inputs based on inconsistent views of
the network, resulting in an analysis result corresponding to
a state the network never actually entered. NetQuery’s con-
sistencyisappropriateforexistingapplicationsforwhichthe
level of consistency provided by sending probe packets suf-
ﬁces. NetQuery applications beneﬁt from a programming
model that enables them to directly extract, rather than infer,
low-level network properties through attribute/value pairs,
reserving programmer effort for deriving higher-level char-
acteristics.
NetQueryalsoenablesnewapplicationsthatrequirestronger
consistency guarantees. NetQuery applications that depend
on long-running characteristics can use triggers to react to
network changes that might invalidate a characteristic. For
instance, supposeanaccesscontrolagentallowsLANaccess
only to end hosts that run approved software. To discover
these hosts, the access control agent issues queries that tra-
verse the LAN’s topology graph. If the graph changes dur-
ing this traversal, the access control agent can miss new end
hosts. These missed hosts cannot connect to the network,
since the access control agent will never examine them to au-
thorize access. To discover all hosts, the access control agent
can install triggers to detect topology changes and restart the
analysis as needed.
The remainder of this section describes the tuplespace ab-
stractions that enable applications to detect, react to, and
control network changes; and to perform analyses that span
multiple attribute/value pairs.
2.3.1 Detecting and controlling network changes
Changes to the network state are propagated to the tu-
plespace through corresponding events. These changes can
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plication. NetQuery applications use triggers to monitor,
or to maintain as valid, a network characteristic over time.
A trigger registers an application’s interest in detecting and
sometimes modifying events. In some cases, triggers can
warn applications when a property on which they relied is
about to change. In others, triggers can maintain a property
on behalf of an application by responding to network events
with remedial actions. Thus, triggers enables guarantees to
clients of the form, “Either characteristic X holds, else no-
tify client C.”
Atriggerconsistsofapredicate, atriggernotiﬁcationtype,
and the IP and port number of a recipient. The predicate
is written in the same pattern language as query() invo-
cations and speciﬁes a set of attribute/value pairs that are
monitored for intended updates. Changes that match the
predicate cause the trigger to ﬁre: when a trigger ﬁres, Net-
Query sends a notiﬁcation packet describing the change to
the indicated IP/port; this packet describes which tuple and
attribute/value pairs have changed, and has the semantics of
a remote upcall to the trigger recipient. Since time is deﬁned
relative to tuplespace changes, NetQuery servers do not re-
quire tightly synchronized clocks.
NetQuery does not run any application-speciﬁc code dur-
ing trigger processing: it pushes the bulk of custom update
processingtoclients, leavingthetuplespaceresponsibleonly
for update detection. This reduces the processing overhead
and complexity of NetQuery servers. NetQuery clients can
use triggers to change how NetQuery updates the tuplespace
in response to a modiﬁcation request; thus, NetQuery inter-
prets these requests as an intent to update.
The controllability of a change determines what actions
can be taken when a trigger ﬁres. Some changes cannot be
controlled by software or hardware. For example, if a user
physically unplugs a network cable, the resultant changes to
the tuplespace cannot be averted. These changes give rise
to advisory events. Often, these real-world changes result
in collateral events that can be controlled. With NetQuery,
these can be deferred, or aborted before they take effect.
NetQuery exposes to applications this control over events
and network devices. These are delayable or vetoable. For
example, while NetQuery has no control over when a user
plugs a computer into a switch, the switch does not need to
immediately provide full network connectivity to the com-
puter. Enabling full network connectivity is both delayable
and vetoable, provided the switch can be instructed to re-
strict connectivity. Networks can enforce policy by defer-
ring such events so that they can take action before the event
occurs. A topology management application can delay an
end host’s request to attach to a switch so that it can ﬁrst
reconﬁgure the switch to place the new end host within the
correct VLAN. Similarly, a ﬁrewall can expose insertion of
new TCP ﬁrewall connection table entries for new ﬂows as
a vetoable event. An access control agent can intercept such
updates to verify that a new ﬂow is allowed by local policy.
Applicationscandetecteventstoreacttonetworkchanges.
Suppose an application uses a particular route because that
routeexhibitsadesiredcharacteristic. Aroutingtablechange
might alter the route, changing this characteristic. For in-
stance, applicationsthatuseNetQuerytodiscoverhigh-capacity
routes for improving throughput, can use advisory events
to adjust its optimization strategy, while applications that
use NetQuery to discover routes with stronger conﬁdential-
ity guarantees, such as those that lack unencrypted wireless,
can use delayable events give the application the opportunity
to check that the new route is acceptable before switching to
it.
Some events are potentially controllable but difﬁcult to
make so under current device architectures. For example,
forwarding table updates are fully under software or hard-
ware control, and it is straightforward to make them de-
layable, because delay can be injected with largely local
code changes. However, making such events vetoable re-
quires error handling code to react to vetoed updates.
The notiﬁcation type determines what a recipient can do
in response to the intended update. There are three types,
ask-veto, ask-delay, and FYI; ask-veto allows the recipient
to cancel the update, ask-delay allows the recipient to de-
fer the update from taking effect, up to a maximum delay,
while it takes corrective action, and FYI (for your informa-
tion) serves as a one-way notiﬁcation for a change in the net-
work. In FYI notiﬁcations, information is only pushed to the
recipient, while for ask-veto and ask-delay, the server waits
for the recipient to respond with whether to veto or delay the
update.
NetQueryserversmediatebetweentuplespacetriggersand
the network by forwarding a veto or delay to the affected
network devices. Thus, vetoes or delays result in canceled
or delayed changes to device state, and hence behavior. The
allowable notiﬁcation types vary, depending on the type of
event that generated the intended tuplespace update and on
the policy of the affected network entity. Vetoable events
support all trigger types, delayable events support ask-delay
and FYI, and advisory events support only FYI.
2.4 Tuplespace access control
Exporting information about network entities can cause
privacy violations, while allowing triggers to exert control
over events can allow malicious users to cause a network to
malfunction. For instance, network operators might want to
protect proprietary information by restricting who can ac-
cess information about their internal networks, and prevent
untrusted users from disrupting network connectivity by re-
stricting ask-veto or ask-delay triggers on routing updates.
Similarly, describing an end host’s software conﬁguration
can reveal private activities about a user. To address these
privacy and safety concerns, NetQuery associates every at-
tribute/value pair with a policy provided by its creator that
speciﬁes which NetQuery clients are allowed to read, query,
and install triggers on that attribute/ value pair (Section 3).
52.5 NetQuery servers and access protocol
NetQuery servers export a tuplespace interface to Net-
Query clients and speakers. Every NetQuery principal is
associated with an administrative domain, whose tuplespace
servers process queries and store tuples and attribute/value-
pairsonbehalfofitslocalprincipals. Requeststhatreference
a tuple or attribute/value-pair are transparently routed to the
tuplespace server that stores it; this is achieved by storing
within every tuple ID and attribute name a pointer to this
“home” server, as identiﬁed by the administrative domain’s
name and the tuplespace server’s IP and port. The remainder
of the TID is typically a unique, opaque byte string.
Some queries, such as those that use wildcard patterns,
require accessing multiple attribute/value pairs from a tuple.
Since the storage location of each attribute/value pair may
resideintuplespaceserversoperatedbydifferentadministra-
tive domains, multiple servers may need to be contacted to
process such queries. Such queries are sent to the server that
stores the tuple, which is responsible for generating a query
execution plan. To determine which other servers to contact,
the server stores a forwarding pointer to every remote tu-
plespace server that stores one or more attribute/value pairs
for the tuple.
A tuplespace server may be embedded within a network
component, such as a router, that exports network informa-
tion, or it can operate as a discrete server in its own right.
Tuplespace servers employ lease-based storage management
fortuplesandperiodicallypurgetuplesthathavenotrecently
been touched.
3. POLICIES FOR TRUST AND
ACCESS CONTROL
Managing the diversity of trust relationships is a central
challenge in disseminating network properties in a heteroge-
neous network. Applications and information providers can
specify policies to control how information is (1) imported
and (2) exported across trust boundaries, and (3) to control
access to potentially dangerous tuplespace operations.
These three different contexts all share a common pol-
icy language establishing trust in network entities. In Net-
Query, every network entity is associated with a principal.
Every utterance, or attribute/value pair or tuplespace opera-
tion issued by an entity, is attributed to that entity’s principal.
The principal to which an attribute/value pair is attributed is
stored in the tuplespace along with the value; this attribution
information is returned along with the value on retrieval. In
NetQuery, principals are bound to a private keys. In princi-
ple, every utterance is signed by the key corresponding to the
speaker; in practice, these keys are used to establish secure
channels that serve as efﬁcient surrogates for signatures.
Every NetQuery policy evaluation reduces to determining
whether an entity trusts some utterance from a principal. For
instance, suppose an end host wants to characterize a route.
This analysis traces through the tuplespace for routing in-
formation. The accuracy of this conclusion is contingent on
the accurate of the inputs: if some analysis were to rely on a
routingtabletuplethatwasexportedfromamaliciousrouter,
and that router did not faithfully copy its real routing table to
the tuplespace, then the inferred route could differ from the
real route. To protect against this, the end host would spec-
ify import policy that accepts only information from trusted
routers, such as those equipped with TPMs.
A NetQuery policy is a set of statements that describes
a set of trusted utterances. Policy statements are based on
delegation. In delegation, a principal A empowers another
principal B to make statements on its behalf. Delegations are
expressed in policy statements of the form
A says B speaksfor A on subjects
The subjects clause is a pattern that describes the scope of
the delegation. These patterns are expressed in terms of tu-
ple IDs, attribute names, and operations, and are matched
against utterances. The NetQuery policy language supports
restrictions based on a tuple’s schema, owner, and underly-
ing device. Delegation restrictions add a layer of indirection
that improves convenience and efﬁciency while preserving
security. Delegation is transitive: a principal that is empow-
ered to make statements about some subject is also empow-
ered to delegate this right to others. NetQuery’s policy se-
mantics allows only a narrowing of subjects on each dele-
gation, thus preventing principals from using delegation to
escalate their privilege.
Consider the import policy for a route characterization ap-
plication Client. With an empty import policy, Client
only trusts statements from itself. To trust statements from a
router R0, Client speciﬁes the import policy
Client says R0 speaksfor Client on
Router. ∗ [router id = R0]
Rather than directly vet every router in the world, which
is cumbersome, inefﬁcient, and unrealistic, the client instead
delegates the responsibility to the manufacturer.
(1) Client says Cisco speaksfor Client on Router.∗
The ﬁrst statement asserts that the client trusts Cisco to
makestatementsaboutrouters. Toempoweraroutertomake
statements about itself, Cisco ships it with a unique pub-
lic/private key pair X and publishes the delegation certiﬁcate,
which restricts the router to only making statements about it-
self.
(2) Cisco says X speaksfor Cisco on
Router. ∗ [router id = X]
WhentheclientretrievesaroutingtableRouter.routing table
attributed to X, the combination of statements (1) and (2)
prove that this routing table is trusted.
63.1 Evaluating policies
Policies are not necessarily static: they can depend on
changes to the network. For instance, the set of routers that
is trusted can grow as new routers are installed. Thus, it is
not possible to include all statements such as (2) in a policy,
since doing so requires enumerating every possible router.
NetQuery provides mechanisms for publishing and dis-
covering such statements. Statements are published to the
tuplespace by the issuing principal like any other property.
When a client checks a policy, it locates the relevant state-
ments to use as credentials. There are several possible mech-
anisms for doing so. For instance, a proof checker can auto-
matically search the tuplespace for the necessary credentials.
While this is convenient for the programmer, this search can
be costly to execute. Often, policies follow an established
pattern, wherein all necessary credentials are in well-known
attribute/valuepairs. Fortherouterpolicy, everyrouterstores
thedelegationstatementissuedbyCiscointheattribute/value
pair Router.credentials. Thus, a general search is not needed.
NetQuery supports both of these mechanisms. NetQuery
provides a schema for exporting policy statements as tuples.
Proof checkers can use tuple queries to search for relevant
statements, just as they do for other tuples. The metadata
stored with a tuple or attached to a tuplespace operation em-
beds credentials supplied by the originating principal; these
credentials are passed to the recipient.
3.2 Increasing policy expressiveness with
trusted computing
Entities built using trusted computing primitives can ex-
port detailed and trustworthy descriptions of themselves to
the tuplespace. TPMs form the basis for establishing trust in
these self-reported properties. TPMs generate certiﬁcates,
called attestations, that describe a chain of trust, rooted at
a TPM, where each link represents a layer of hardware or
software that is responsible for identifying and vetting the
next layer. For instance, the TPM vets the trusted OS, which
in turn asserts that a process with a given hash and conﬁg-
uration is running. TPMs provide a Quote operation that
cryptographically binds a message to an attestation. Trusted
operating systems can use quote to export detailed informa-
tion about its processes that can be trusted by remote hosts.
Quoted information is translated to NetQuery attribute/value
pairs by deriving the principal from the attestation and the
attribute/value pair from the message.
This information expands the expressiveness of policies.
For instance, rather than identifying trusted entities by prin-
cipal name, policies can instead identify trusted entities by
their properties.
Consider the tuple representation of a TPM-equipped host
running a trusted Linux and a software router (Figure 4):
(1) The trustworthiness of the host hardware platform to
make statements about the OS is established by the boot-
time attestation, stored in the Host.credentials ﬁeld. The trust-
worthiness of the OS to make statements about its processes
(1) TPMi.Linuxj = h
[TPMi,tuple type = Host],
[TPMi,credentials = TPM HW platform attestation],
[TPMi,hash = TrustedLinuxv2.6],
[TPMi.Linuxj,process = TPMi.Linuxj.SoftRouterk]i
(2) TPMi.Linuxj.SoftRouterk = h
[TPMi.Linuxj,tuple type = Process],
[TPMi.Linuxj,hash = Routerv1.0],
[TPMi.Linuxj,allow only = CfgRTNetlink],
// allow only of all other processes exclude CfgRTNetlink
i
(3) R1 = h
[TPMi.Linuxj.SoftRouterk,tuple type = Router],
[TPMi.Linuxj.SoftRouterk,routing table =
{10.0.0.0/8 ⇒ eth0,...}]i
Figure 4: Tuple representation for TPM-
equipped software router. Per-attribute/value pair
credentials are omitted.
is established by Host.hash. (2) Even though the client trusts
the Routerv1.0 software to properly report routing informa-
tion, checking the hash is not sufﬁcient. Under Linux, any
sufﬁciently privileged processes can modify the kernel rout-
ing table by invoking the RTNetlink kernel interface, caus-
ing the device state to diverge from the tuple representation.
Thus, the import policy for router information (3) veriﬁes
that (a) the router process has the right hash (Process.hash)
and (b) only the router process, and no other process, can
invoke RTNetlink (Process.allow only of all processes).
3.3 Summary
Figure 5 summarizes how policies are integrated into the
NetQuery interface and data model.
3.3.1 Import policies
Client applications check import policies for all inputs re-
ceived from the tuplespace (Figure 5-B.1). These checks
cover both values retrieved from the tuplespace and trigger
notiﬁcation upcalls, which deliver information about value
changes in attribute/value pairs. Import policies are typically
speciﬁed by the application developer, but can be modiﬁed
byusersaccordingtolocalrequirements. Forinstance, asys-
tem administrator might relax policies to trust all statements
made by routers in the intranet.
3.3.2 Export policies
The tuplespace server checks all operations that can re-
turn tuples and attribute/value pairs against export policies
(Figure 5-B.2). In addition to query and retrieve, which im-
mediately return information, trigger notiﬁcation upcalls are
also checked, since they return information in response to
network changes. Export policies can be speciﬁed for every
7Figure 5: Complete NetQuery architecture. (A)
Extensions to data model to support attribution and
credentials. (B) Location of policy enforcement: (B.1)
Import policies. (B.2) Export policies. (B.3) Modiﬁca-
tion policies.
attribute/value pair, and are typically speciﬁed by the user.
For instance, an ISP that wants to protect proprietary infor-
mation from escaping its network would allow NetQuery ac-
cess only from entities residing on its own network.
3.3.3 Modiﬁcation policies
The tuplespace server checks against modiﬁcation poli-
cies any operations, such as ask-delay and ask-veto trigger
installation and notiﬁcation upcalls, that can modify the be-
havior of the network (Figure 5-B.3). Export policies can
be speciﬁed for every attribute/value pair, and are typically
speciﬁed by the user. For instance, system administrators
willtypicallyrestrictask-delayandask-vetotriggersforshared
network devices, such as switches and routers, to only those
trusted hosts used for network management and monitoring.
4. APPLICATIONS
We present examples of how the NetQuery programming
model enables new functionality based on reasoning about
network and client properties.
4.1 Networks checking end hosts
NetQuery enables networks to make decisions based on
the properties of end hosts. Network administrators often re-
strict network access to hosts meeting criteria based on such
properties. For instance, our campus network administra-
tors require end hosts to defend themselves and the network
against known worms by requiring Windows installations to
be up-to-date with patches and to run a virus checker. These
requirements are only loosely enforced: compliance is mon-
itored only by a web page where the user checks a checkbox.
NetQuery enables the network to securely query end hosts
for the relevant properties. End hosts export tuples describ-
ingtheiroperatingsystem, conﬁgurationofthenetworkstack,
and active processes. Network switches query this informa-
tion when checking whether a new host is authorized to at-
tach to the network.
Network switches specify an import policy that ensures
that this information is genuine. The import policy requires
the end hosts to back up their claims with execution cer-
tiﬁcates, as derived from TPM attestations. These certiﬁ-
cates assert that the host is running a operating system that
is trusted to make statements concerning the set of running
processes. To prevent process-level spooﬁng, the operating
system describes the identifying properties of each process,
such as a cryptographic hash of its program image.
Switches initially restrict new hosts to only send and re-
ceive packets for NetQuery. When a host ﬁrst attaches to
a switch, it exports its tuples to the local NetQuery server.
Upon detecting a new host, a switch checks the host’s tuples
to determine the list of processes:
NewHost says NewHost.processes = [
{HashLabel = VirusChecker}, {HashLabel = Firefox3.0}, ...
]
If the host runs the required software, then the switch al-
lows it full network access. On doing so, the switch installs
a trigger on the process list to detect changes that would in-
dicate a violation of the policy. For instance, the trigger will
ﬁre if the virus checker stops running, notifying the switch
to revoke the host’s network access.
4.2 End hosts checking networks
Service providers often compete solely on price, because
the differences between a well-operated, well-provisioned
network and a poorly-run competitor are mostly hidden from
clients when each offers the same IP forwarding interface.
Compared with existing out-of-band mechanisms, exchang-
ing information about differences through NetQuery is more
robust and efﬁcient. NetQuery facilitates the use of a ser-
vice description language that enables service providers to
differentiate their service by directly advertising their per-
formance characteristics and empowers clients to exchange
information about service providers. Clients can use infor-
mation self-reported by an ISP or reported by other clients
in making service selection decisions.
Ahigh-performanceISPcanadvertisethisfactbydescrib-
ing how its network is operated. For instance, a wireless ISP
might perform trafﬁc shaping or QoS to ensure that each end
host is allocated a fair share of resources. Access points ex-
port statements such as
APi says wlan0.traﬃc shaping = true
to specify that the features are active on its wireless interface.
8To improve efﬁciency and to hide proprietary details from
end hosts, the ISP can use a third party analysis service to
assert that its network is well-run. Such services query the
tuplespace for an ISP’s topology information to determine
how it is expected to perform at a particular access point and
annotates the ISP with the result:
TPMi.Linuxj.H323 Certifierk says
GoodForVoIP(ISP.HW MAC#00 : 00 : 00 : 11 : 11 : 11)
Users can also report information about an ISP. For in-
stance, a VoIP application can report a summary of the de-
livered quality of service:
CiscoATAi says GoodForVoIP(10.1.2.55)
Clients use import policies to rely on only trustworthy
statements during service selection. By attributing the state-
mentstotrustworthyprovidersortrustedsoftware, NetQuery
prevents malicious ISPs or users from injecting inaccurate
information. The H.323 certiﬁer is trusted to make accurate
statements about a network’s ability to support the H.323
telephony protocol: it only bases its analysis on tuples from
trustworthydevices. Similarly, CiscoATAhardwareistrusted
to make statements based on actual observations.
4.3 Between networks
When two networks are interconnected, network adminis-
trators and system designers often concerned about the prop-
erties of each network. For instance, ASes generally require
their peers to be reliable and behave consistently [2].
Using NetQuery to exchange information between ASes
improves security and robustness. NetQuery enables ASes
to perform static analysis on the conﬁguration and topology
of their peers. If this analysis shows that a peer is properly
conﬁgured, an AS can accept routes from that peer with-
out adverse performance impacts. For instance, an analy-
sis can use standard techniques to verify that the peer net-
work is robust to single-node failures and propagates only
valid routes. Such analyses operate on tuplespace encodings
of router conﬁguration ﬁles, as expressed in the normalized
form from rcc:
Router1 says Router1.sessions = [
{ neighbor = 10.1.2.3,
importPolicy = [
{ permit = allow, ASregex =
∧65000, ... },
... ...
ASes that enter mutual transit backup relationships can
use NetQuery to verify that backup routes are used only
when alternate routes are not available. These analyses are
implemented using dynamic checking: triggers detect route
withdrawals and link failures by monitoring received adver-
tisements and link status:
EdgeRouter1 says EdgeRouter.validAdjRibIn = [
{nextHop = eth0, preﬁx = 10.1.2.0/24,
ASPath = (22 1 76)},
... ]
EdgeRouter1 says EdgeRouter.eth0.status = UP
Changessuchas EdgeRouter1.eth0.status transitioningtoDOWN
serve as evidence of failures that can authorize the peer to
transmit packets through the backup ISP.
As in preceding examples, the analysis software is sup-
plied by a third party and it executes on a trustworthy plat-
form under the control of the ISP. The verity of the state-
ments contained in the preceding tuples stems from the use
of trusted routing platforms. Other import policies can be
employed to support legacy routers. For instance, the analy-
sis service can use statements from a trustworthy scraper ap-
plication that extracts conﬁguration data through router CLI.
The scraper only executes on behalf of ISPs that are trusted
to operate routers that respond correctly to the scraper’s CLI
queries.
4.4 Extending functionality with triggers
NetQuerytriggersallowtheinterpositionofarbitrarycode
on network operations. By combining triggers with analy-
sis of end host information, NetQuery clients can extend the
network with new functionality without modiﬁcation to the
underlying NetQuery devices.
Forinstance, aNetQueryswitchcanallowNetQueryclients
to manage access to the network by providing ask-veto ac-
cess to port status changes. This approach provides more
ﬂexibility than embedding a policy within the device (Sec-
tion 4.1). NACAgent, a NetQuery application that enforces a
process list-based access policy, uses the trigger
CHANGE(Switch.ports[∗].status)
to detect when a port connects to a new host. Upon detecting
a new host, the switch proposes the change:
Switch says
PROPOSE CHANGE(Switch.ports[0].status = UP)
The switch does not fully activate the port until after the
tuplespace accepts the proposed update, which occurs after
all matching triggers are delivered and acknowledged. Upon
receiving the trigger, NACAgent analyzes the new host’s tu-
ples to determine whether it is running an approved set of
processes and accordingly signals acceptance or veto in the
update’s acknowledgment. The host is subsequently allowed
to send packets to the network.
Anetworkadministratorwhowantstorestrictpotentialat-
tacksthroughunsecuredwirelesslinkscanmodifyNACAgent
to verify that all hosts have deactivated their wireless NICs
before connecting to the network. This NACAgent0 inspects
the host’s tuplespace description of its network stack:
NewHost says NewHost.wiﬁ0.status = DISABLED
9NACAgent0 allows access once it veriﬁes that all wireless
cardsaredisabled. Aswiththeprocesslistpolicy, NACAgent0
adds triggers on the status attribute/value pairs to detect fu-
ture enablement of the wireless card; upon receiving such
changes, NACAgent0 revokes the host’s access to the net-
work.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented NetQuery on real network hard-
ware and software. The core functionality is composed of a
stand-alone tuplespace server and a client library for writing
NetQuery devices and applications. We have implemented a
NetQuery switch as a Linux user process, a NetQuery router
adapted from the Quagga router, a NetQuery host that runs
Nexus and exports attested information about its processes
and network stack, and applications that rely on the exported
properties from these devices.
Thetuplespaceserver, whilelargelyunoptimized, ishighly
scalable. Since the tuplespace stores representation of net-
work state that already exists elsewhere in the network, al-
beit not in a format that enables trustworthy dissemination
and analysis, the tuplespace server does not need to pro-
vide durability. In the event of server failure, the original
copy of the network state resides within network devices; to
recover from failure, the tuplespace servers instruct the de-
vices to store anew its full tuplespace representation. Thus, a
simple in-memory implementation sufﬁces and can provide
high performance without compromising correctness. The
server implements the distributed tuplespace access proto-
col, allowing us to manage the load from large test networks
by spreading it across multiple tuplespace servers.
Thetuplespaceserversupportsthecompletesetofattribute
types and operations. The tuplespace supports a basic trigger
predicate and query language. We are extending the predi-
cate, query, and indexing functionality as needed by our ap-
plications. Currently, patterns are speciﬁed by exact or wild-
card match on a single tuple ID and attribute name. Exact
match triggers are used during analysis to detect concurrent
changes that might invalidate the analysis. For convenience
of programming, applications can conﬁgure the library to
automatically generate such triggers during all reads. We
intend to use wildcard matches to build rendezvous mecha-
nism for discovering network devices and invoking network
services.
Our work on applications and devices has highlighted the
importance of several optimizations. Special indexes for
widely-used network state are essential to achieving good
performance. For instance, efﬁciently exporting and explor-
ing the IP level connectivity of a network requires good up-
dateandlookupperformanceforforwardingtables. Toachieve
this in a compact representation, we imported the Linux im-
plementation of LPC-trie. Although NetQuery, by design,
enables clients to establish trust without the assistance of
network administrators, trusted tuplespace servers can sig-
niﬁcantly reduce computational overhead. By trusting a tu-
plespace server to preserve the integrity of stored statements
and to accurately report the speaker of a statement, a Net-
Query client does not need to generate and verify digital cer-
tiﬁcates on every statement exported to and imported from
the tuplespace.
5.1 NetQuery devices
The NetQuery switch provides features that enable the
derivation of strong network guarantees. The switch exports
its internal state as attribute/value pairs that support ask-veto
triggers. This provides applications with a great degree of
control over network topology, including what devices are
attached. The NetQuery switch provides similar function-
ality to wireless 802.1x to preserve the accuracy of the re-
ported topology. Peer devices are authenticated before they
are allowed to connect to the network. Once devices are
connected, transparent encryption can be activated to pre-
serve link-layer integrity. These mechanisms enable Net-
Query clients to trust that adversaries cannot compromise
the accuracy of the tuplespace by subverting the underlying
link layer assumptions.
TheNetQueryrouterisLinux-basedandderivedfromQuagga.
Only localized changes to the control plane were necessary
to convert all interface and routing table changes into Net-
Query attribute/value pairs that support ask-delay triggers.
NetQuery-Quagga interposes on Quagga’s interface to
rtnetlink, Linux’s low-level interface to its in-kernel dat-
aplane, and exports all relevant requests, such as changes to
the forwarding table and NIC state, to the tuplespace. In to-
tal, only 777 lines of localized changes were needed, out of
a total code base of 190,538 LOC.
TheNetQueryswitchandrouterexportconnectivityinfor-
mation about the NetQuery-enabled peers that are attached
to their local interfaces. Exporting connectivity informa-
tion enables applications to explore the network by crawl-
ing its tuple representation. Unlike the NetQuery-Switch,
NetQuery-Quagga does not support veto triggers; doing so
would have required extensive changes to Quagga.
5.2 NetQuery applications
We have built several applications that use the tuplespace
to extend the functionality of these devices and to provide
applications with guarantees about the network. We used
triggers to extend the NetQuery switch with a custom net-
work access control (NAC) policy, described in Section 4.4,
that allows access only to Nexus hosts that are running virus
checkers. We implemented a generic route characterization
analysis, which determines the route between a source and
destination, and detects any changes that can modify the
route. This analysis is a building block for more complex
analyses of route characteristics; for instance, an application
can check whether a route respects user privacy by checking
that none of the entities on the route perform packet inspec-
tion.
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Figure 6: NetQuery operation throughput and
latency versus tuplespace size. The performance of
all operations is independent of the tuplespace size.
6. EVALUATION
NetQuery performs well for both ISPs and applications: it
can be integrated into network devices with little overhead,
efﬁciently deployed on large networks and provide strong
guarantees and good throughput for applications. All ex-
periments used a testbed consisting of Linux 2.6.23 hosts
equippedwith8-core2.5GHzIntelXeonprocessorsandcon-
nected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch. Cryptography is dis-
abled in all experiments.
6.1 Microbenchmarks
We show through microbenchmarks that NetQuery can
support large tuplestore and immensely high tuple creation,
modiﬁcation, and deletion rates. Thus, the unoptimized pro-
totype is capable of supporting the peak needs of an ISP. The
microbenchmark was distributed across sixteen NetQuery
clientprocesses, runningonasinglemachinewitheightcores,
and eight tuplespace server processes, running on a single,
separate machine with eight cores. In the throughput exper-
iment, the microbenchmark issued a sequence of pipelined
requests, without waiting for responses from the server until
allwereissued(Figures6). Noforwardingpointerswerefol-
lowed for these operations, since every attribute/value pair
resided on the same server as its tuple.
With the exception of Delete Attribute(), the perfor-
mance of all tuplespace operations is decoupled from the
size of the tuplespace. For smaller tuplespace sizes, the
Delete Attribute() experiments were of such short du-
ration that initialization overheads dominated the overall ex-
ecution time. The reduced throughput of Delete Tuple()
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Figure 7: Trigger-induced update completion
time overhead. The types of trigger and maximum
server to client RTT, rather than the number of trig-
gers, dominate trigger overhead.
was due to the initial tuplespace state for this experiment,
wherein every tuple was initialized with nine attribute/value
pairs. Deletingatuplealsoentaileddeletingitsattribute/value
pairs.
The latency experiments used one server and client and
only measured operations where the client necessarily waits
for data. For instance, Create Tuple() and Read
Attribute() returned the tuple ID of the new tuple and at-
tribute value, respectively.
The latency of a tuplespace operation can also depend on
any induced trigger notiﬁcations; such operations may re-
quire the server to wait for a response from a trigger recipi-
ent. Sending trigger notiﬁcations in parallel limits such im-
pacts. Figure 7 shows the trigger-induced delays to an at-
tribute update under trigger workloads that varied by trigger
type and WAN delay between the tuplespace server and trig-
ger recipients. RTT and trigger types were the primary de-
terminants for delay. Since trigger notiﬁcations were sent in
parallel, the overall completion time for the update time was
dominated by the latency of the most expensive notiﬁcation,
rather than the total number of trigger notiﬁcations. This ex-
periment shows that NetQuery can support a large number of
WAN end hosts that use FYI triggers. While ask-delay and
ask-veto is less scalable, these are intended to support man-
agement and control applications, which typically run on a
small number of hosts.
6.2 Performance on real-world traces
To demonstrate that NetQuery has low device overhead
and efﬁciently utilizes server resources, we measured the
NetQuery overheads associated with reﬂecting device state
changes to the tuplespace and the corresponding overhead
for tuplespace servers. Our exemplar device was a NetQuery
Quagga BGP router and was subjected to a realistic work-
load, derived from a RouteViews trace. The Quagga router
and tuplespace servers were executed on separate machines.
The workload generator converted the RouteViews data into
a BGP stream and ran on the same machine as the router.
11To demonstrate that NetQuery can efﬁciently import bulk
data from NetQuery devices, we measured the completion
timeforrouterinitializationandthetuplespacememoryfoot-
printof arouter. Weused RouteViewsRIBtraces togenerate
a full BGP routing table transfer (268K preﬁxes) that fully
initialized a router’s forwarding table; such transfers were
exceptionally intensive for both the router and tuplespace
server. Upon receiving the transfer, the BGP router down-
loads a full forwarding table to the IP forwarding layer. The
standard BGP router completed in 5.70 s, while the Net-
Query BGP router completed in 13.5 s.
TodemonstratethatNetQueryroutersperformwellinstea-
dy state, we evaluated the router against a workload derived
from RouteViews update traces. The workload generator
sent updates in 1 second batches. The experiment recorded
the time needed to completely commit the resulting changes
to the IP forwarding tables and to the tuplespace. We mea-
sured NetQuery’s performance on a total of 30 hours of up-
date traces, composed of three hour traces from 10 randomly
selected source routers.
ThestandardQuaggaserverhadamediancompletiontime
of 62.2 ms, while the NetQuery Quagga server had a me-
dian completion time of 63.4 ms. Thus, the NetQuery router
can react to network changes almost as quickly as a standard
router, minimizing the disruption to local forwarding.
The overhead introduced by NetQuery does not increase
convergence time even under conservative router implemen-
tation assumptions. Suppose the overhead is in the critical
path of BGP update propagation, either because RIB infor-
mation is to be exported, or because the FIB update blocks
BGP update propagation. Since BGP convergence is gov-
erned by mandatory artiﬁcial delays to BGP update propaga-
tion, NetQuery’s overheads do not impact convergence time.
For instance, BGP’s MRAI timer delays the propagation of
all BGP updates by 30 seconds, sufﬁciently long to hide Net-
Query’s initialization and steady state overheads. Even the
initialization overhead, the largest possible forwarding table
change, is shorter.
The full 268K entry forwarding table consumed only 10.7
MB of server memory. The unoptimized NetQuery wire pro-
tocol required 62.8MB to transmit the full table at initializa-
tiontime. NetQueryrequiredonly3KB,92KB,and480KB
to transmit the median, mean, and maximum update sizes
seen during steady state.
Performance within ISP networks.
Here, we show through analysis and experiments that a
smallnumberofNetQueryserverscancollecttuplespaceup-
dates from every router in a POP without degrading perfor-
mance.
We can see this by using the results from the previous
experiment to estimate the necessary resources to deploy
NetQuery. The largest POP in the Sprint RocketFuel topol-
ogy consists of 66 routers [19]. Storing the full forward-
ing tables of all routers required 0.66 GB of memory, easily
ﬁtting within the 16 GB memory capacity of our test ma-
chine. Since tuplespace servers are local to the POP, the
burst of trafﬁc during initialization traverses high capacity
local links. Assuming a conservative lower bound of 1 s be-
tween routing updates, the median bandwidth utilization is
less than 198 KB/s, or less than 0.2% of a gigabit link.
To determine the number of servers needed to process tu-
plespace updates without delaying BGP convergence, con-
sider the processing bottlenecks. The MRAI timer sets a
constraint of 30 s on completion time. In this worst case, all
routers are reloading at the same time, ensuring that load-
balancing is close to ideal. For 66 routers and initialization
overhead of 13.5 s, 30 cores, or four machines, are needed
to meet this deadline. These constraints can be relaxed if the
ISP and users are willing to make tradeoffs during periods of
high network disruption. For instance, high availability ap-
plications might forgo guarantees in exchange for minimiz-
ing downtime, while security conscious applications might
accept increased downtime in exchange for preserving guar-
antees.
To validate these results, we ran an experiment to mea-
sure the aggregate route update overhead induced by routers
within a real ISP topology. We used the Sprint Rocket-
Fuel topology, which consists of 17,163 Sprint and customer
edge routers. Although the resulting forwarding table are
smaller, IGP deployments can have stricter deadline con-
straints: since routing instability is easier to manage within a
single AS, routers are often conﬁgured to propagate updates
as quickly as possible to minimize convergence time. The
workload consisted of forwarding table updates for internal
routes, generated through simulation of hierarchical shortest
path routing. The resulting trace for a single POP was fed to
a real tuplespace server over a Gigabit Ethernet link.
We measured for each POP the completion time of ini-
tialization and of updates resulting from a set of correlated
link failures, with the failure rate varying between 0.01 and
0.09. For the ﬁve largest POPs, each consisting of 51 to 66
routers, the median initialization time for loading all rout-
ing table entries for every router was 13.3 s. For failure
rates of up to 0.05, the mean and median update times of
the POP were less than 0.24 s and 0.14 s, respectively; these
local delays to forwarding table updates are negligible in
most networks. This delay does not impact global routing
convergence for typical link-state routing protocols such as
OSPF. Such delays typically result if ﬂooding is delayed. In
general, routing protocol implementations decouple ﬂood-
ing from RIB/FIB calculations. Since NetQuery only hooks
onto the critical path of forwarding table updates, no delay
is introduced to the critical path for ﬂooding.
6.3 Macrobenchmarks
To determine the cost of using NetQuery to establish guar-
antees, we measured the performance of the route charac-
terization analysis, which is used by several applications to
establish path guarantees. We ran the query on a set of Net-
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Figure 8: Route characterization analysis. The
network and processing overhead increase linearly with
path length, as does completion time.
Query Quagga servers arranged in a line topology and con-
nected to a single tuplespace server process. The query cost
and execution time increases linearly with path length (Fig-
ure 8). Route characterizations enables applications to de-
termine path properties in a trustworthy fashion. Although
standard traceroute is less expensive than route characteriza-
tion, it is not capable of supporting such applications.
7. RELATED WORK
Network design has shifted towards using a logically cen-
tralized server to make control decisions on behalf of every
device in a network, rather than distributing control across
multiple devices [5, 9, 3]. Similarly, NetQuery centrally col-
lects network properties to isolate devices from the perfor-
mance impact of queries and triggers.
Perhaps the closest work to NetQuery are network excep-
tion handlers (NEH) and NOX, which are logically central-
ized systems for enterprise networks that collect network
properties and disseminate it to administrative applications
[14, 10]. NEH collects dynamic topology, load statistics,
and link costs from the network infrastructure, and exposes
these properties so that end hosts can detect and react to
exceptional network conditions. NOX collects information
about topology from infrastructure devices and user/service
bindings concerning end hosts and exposes this information
to network management applications running on a central
controller. NetQuery supports these applications for enter-
prise networks, while also supporting applications that is-
sue queries that span multiple ASes. NetQuery’s tuplespace
supports heterogeneous information sources by tracking the
source of every statement and by leveraging trusted hard-
ware. While NEH and NOX are intended for applications
speciﬁed by the network administrator, NetQuery enables
any user application to query the network.
Secure Network Datalog (SeNDlog) is a declarative pro-
gramming system for building distributed applications on
untrusted networks [22]. With declarative programming sys-
tems, distributed applications are written as high-level rules,
which are compiled to query execution plans that are exe-
cuted at every node. SeNDlog extends declarative program-
ming with logic-based access control. As with NetQuery,
SeNDlog uses says as the basis for decentralized autho-
rization policies.
Network management systems are widely deployed on the
Internet. Intradomain management protocols such as SNMP
and CMIS/CMIP provide standard schemas and protocols
for disseminating information about network devices [11,
13]. NetQuery can be retroﬁtted on top of existing SNMP
and CMIS/CMIP interfaces. RPSL is the standard language
for exporting information about ASes across administrative
boundaries [1]. This information is disseminated through
the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), a globally distributed
database for RPSL statements. Although network analyses
have been designed using this system [18], the questionable
accuracy of IRR information, which stems from inconsistent
update mechanisms across the ISPs that contribute informa-
tion, limits the guarantees that applications can derive from
such analysis. NetQuery’s rich policy language enables ap-
plications to reason about the verity of tuplespace informa-
tion.
Trusted Network Connect (TNC) is an emerging standard
for network access control of end hosts [21]. Client autho-
rization in TNC is similar to that of NetQuery. A network
administrator speciﬁes a network access policy to restrict ac-
cess to the network. Before an end host is allowed to join the
network, TNC veriﬁes that its software and hardware conﬁg-
uration satisﬁes the policy. Unlike NetQuery, TNC does not
provide a channel by which the end host can discover the
properties of the network before deciding to connect.
Internet measurements are used to derive properties of the
network such as network topology or predicted network per-
formance [19, 20, 16]. In addition to providing information
for these inference tools, NetQuery can serve as a medium
for network information service providers to publish the re-
sults.
8. CONCLUSION
NetQuery provides a new channel for disseminating the
properties of network entities. The architecture of the sys-
tem is well-suited to the scale of the Internet and supports
the hardware provisioning, conﬁdentiality policies, and trust
relationships found in heterogeneous networks. It is admin-
istratively decentralized, provides a ﬂexible tuple-based data
model, and supports safe analysis. These features reduce the
barrier to entry for new kinds of network information ser-
vices and applications, and facilitates incremental deploy-
ment in legacy networks. We have experimentally shown
that NetQuery performs well on real routers, and can sup-
port the volume of network state found in large enterprise
and ISP networks. NetQuery provides a general program-
ming model that appropriate for a diverse range of applica-
tions, including verifying contractual obligations, enforcing
user-speciﬁed policies, and enhancing performance.
NetQuery is well-positioned to leverage the trusted hard-
ware that is increasingly available within networks. We be-
lieve that a general-purpose channel for disseminating se-
13cure statements issued by trusted hardware as well as signed
statements from network operators and users will enable a
new and exciting class of applications based on meta-level
reasoning about the state of the network.
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